Social Change and History

In this week's readings I found the last chapter of William H. Sewell Jr.'s Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation to be of a high degree of interest. Within Logics of History William H. Sewell seeks to re-characterize interactions between social scientists and historians by fostering an exchange of views and approaches to human interaction. Fundamental to the reworking of the historical-social sciences relationship, Sewell argues, is a conscious attempt to reconcile the divide between synchronic and diachronic interpretations of the past. Sewell writes "Anthropology's classical notions of culture, no less that sociology's classical notions of social structure, needs to be infused with historical temporalities" (18). I agree with the assertion that social scientists, especially those analyzing the most fundamental levels of human interaction, would benefit from treating the past as a foreign country. Historians have largely long since abandoned overarching and deterministic views of human interaction, choosing instead to emphasize contingency and agency. However, Sewell is also correct that Historians must utlilize diachronic as well as the standard synchronic contextualization to more accurately cover a historical subject. The results of Sewell's efforts culminate in chapter 9 titled "Refiguring the "Social" in Social Science." In this chapter William Sewell gives a history of the changing meanings of "social" in order to parallel its rise with other concepts like "history" and "culture" during 18th century and Enlightenment. Sewell argues that these terms have come to represent "the totality of complex interrelatedness that we understand as constituting the basic reality of human existence" and carry a mystical vagueness which belies their importance as world-view defining concepts (326). As abstract aggregates these ideas carry a wealth of meanings and uses which must be explored in a diachronic fashion and require "the search for a much wider variety of semiotic methods" (339). Sewell's argument waxes on the idea of the social as a language game with a distinct emphasis on the game aspect. Overall, I found this work to be a creative point of view for reconciling many of the far-flung differences in emphases between social scientists and historians. Sewell also effectively argues for the value and necessity of both diachronic and synchronic approaches to history.

Internet as Subject Index?

The individual accounts of historians' research and archival work in Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History peaked my interest this week. Each of these archive stories gave a different view and personalized assessment of the objectivity of archives and documentary evidence. I found each article to be interesting and informative in their own right but one article especially caught my attention and got me thinking. Renée M. Sentille's chapter regarding the use of the Internet left me pondering many questions about the utility of Internet archival methods in their present functionality, especially in regards to historians. I agree with Sentille's assertion that the Internet is a valuable tool but in essence will always be virtual. The experience and knowledge gained by physical engagement with source materials is irreplaceable and at current technological levels not recreate-able on the Internet. Also I agree with his assessment of the Internet as a shifting and ephemeral thing which in most cases of historical inquiry offers up many social and popular conceptions. This can be seen in his inquiries on Adah Menken conjuring up volumes of pages with different views of her as Jewish, African American, Feminist etc. In my opinion and experience, the Internet is representative of all who connect and use it albeit not equally or uniformly. Pornographic, business, academic, government, and entertainment sites, especially from metropole nations (primarily the U.S.) seem to dominate the sources of Internet materials. Though the 'net has the potential, if economics and technology keep up, to encompass virtually all textual, artistic, and language based human interaction, this is not the situation today. I think that for one of the most technologically engaged and computer/Internet savvy portions of the population, college students (graduate included), the Internet functions as an amorphous subject index. This is to say that it is an index which does not really tie back to any specific place but serves often as a jumping off platform for the researcher to other affiliated subjects and points of views. Open source encyclopedias like Wikipedia often serve students as 1.subject director 2. index of terms and 3. annotated bibliography. Websites such as Wikipedia can function for researchers as a gauge of popular historiography of those who connect to it and use it. The Internet can inspire some bad impressions, especially in historians who base their proof on documentary and material evidence. The fact is, though, that if things continue technologically it will most likely come to dominate most language based transferences of information. I do not think that the book will be replaced completely but research and work in history will continue to become more Internet based as more resources become available and distant connections mandate. Sentille begs the question as to whether historians should develop complex search algorithms to aid in research and I agree. The Internet is inherently nebulous and changing, requiring complex modes of categorizing and searching increasingly larger and more complex archives. However, I think that historians, especially academics and scholars, must associate and connect themselves to the Internet on a much larger and more social scale in order garner its benefits. Open source encyclopedias represent a chance to allow communities to govern and arbitrate information for themselves. I think that professional historians, too, should organize on the Internet to facilitate open discussions of historiography.

The Sexual Contract

Within the reading for this week I found Carole Patemans's The Sexual Contract to captivate my interests the most. I've always been interested in social contract and specifically its political ramifications but Pateman argues a novel view. I am inclined to agree with her that there has been a historical neglect of the source and influence of private sphere. Most interesting, to me, though, is Pateman's assertion that "political right originates in the sex-right" (3). Carole Pateman argues that from the very beginning the social contract was superseded and in a manner determined (in its future exercise) by the core assumptions of the contract itself. Out of the language of individualism and common rights of the social contract era Pateman identifies the mode by which patriarchal control was replaced with paternal right in contract, labor, and gender relations. Pateman identifies the rationalization and obfuscation of the male paternal right as a function of the historic idea of the individual and free contracts. By clarifying the historical birth of the idea of individual as a male dominated perspective, Pateman gives creedence to the necessity of a reformulation of contract theory. To learn that there exists a purposefully embraced disconnect in the historical formulation between ideas of the individual and the female should give any ardent believer of social contract theory reason to pause. The inherent inequality of the original sexual contract which was re-manifested in all of social contract has resulted in a warped and obscured presentation off equal individuals. Just as Pateman asserts, in this manifestation of social contract men's sexual desires are fulfilled in the capitalist market while the division of female into the private sphere denotes prostitution as a vice and crime, rather than business contract. This example does not to seek to judge on the morality of prostitution, rather, it manifestly shows the disconnect between females and their "individual" right to their bodily labor. As historians, and specifically those focused on what is termed "Western" history, Pateman's argument is necessary to grasp how and why both the public and private are politically relevant. Even more, Pateman's argument suggests that we must not bind our understandings of social and political interactions to primarily private or public in nature.

Sexual Determinism and Conceptions of Gender

Within the first few paragraphs of Joan W. Scott's "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis" the author offers up the a growing definition of contemporary conceptions of gender. Academics and feminists alike have begun to approach gender "as a way of referring to the social organization of the relationship between the sexes" (1053). In reading this it struck me as a congenial definition considering the implications of Denise Riley's argument in Am I that Name? Riley flushes out the historical conceptions of sex and gender by analyzing the multifarious character traits attributed to the female sex in English society since the 1500s. In the course of this exposition Riley shows that that sex, in her case specifically female, has been characterized as closer to Nature, more in tune with social activities, equal in religious rights but not intellectual, and a host of other ascribed beliefs about gender. Deterministic and historically specific beliefs about the female sex, for Riley, have caused a rift to form in Feminism. Riley identifies feminists across the temporal spectrum as torn between characterizing women as different and singular because of their sex and arguing that gender and femininity are complete constructs and sexual differences are ephemeral. Riley argues that this division has prevented feminists from seeing the manifest ambiguity of sex. Feminists must recognize the socially constructed nature of sex as well as the all too real effects gender determinism has had on perceptions of sex. I think that Riley has the right idea when she writes that to engage this ambiguity "a history of several categories...would be demanded in order to glimpse the history of one" (14). Though Scott provides an excellent definition of gender as a social organization it does not accommodate for the many other social facets which affect gender perceptions. If gender truly is not a social construct, the only method by which we can determine this is to treat gender as a construct and attempt to delineate the variety of other factors which inform and define sex.

Cusset and French Theory

This week’s reading imparted a closer view of the way theory and academic thought is transformed as well as informed by foreign readings and exportation. Francois Cusset emphasizes the transformative nature of the capture, transmittance, and re-evaluation of theory and knowledge. Concomitantly, Cusset demonstrates the contextual specificity of those interpretations and various methods by which theory may be transmitted across societies and cultures. Within the conclusion of Francois Cusset’s French Theory a quote from Oswald Spengler simplifies this view; “The more enthusiastically we laud the principles of an alien thought, the more fundamentally in truth we have denatured it” (337). I took this to mean that the more one understands and applies a foreign produced taxonomy to one’s own context, the less it tends to resemble the insider’s view of the theory. Alternatively, this means that theories, like those of Derrida and Foucault, which, over time, lost much of the power and essence of their traditional understandings in France were not exhausted theory. Cusset effectively demonstrates the way theory, imported into a different social and academic context in the United States, was interpreted and understood in alternate and viable mode. Consequently, whereas at the time Foucault and Derrida were marginalized in France, an understanding of their theories, birthed in the American context, allowed for a reapplication of those ideas. According to Cusset, not just the contextual mode of interpretation can affect a change in theoretical orientation and application. The mode of transmittance plays a large role in how theory is received and applied (90). Cusset identifies the literary vessels by which French Theory took hold in the United States as an exemplar of this principle. Though French Theory was also academically introduced to Americans, the multilateral reality of the literary and artistic expressions of this theory largely contributed to its altered American form. Cusset does well to remind us to question whether we can look beyond the criticisms inspired by our own experiences as well to show that theory is permenantly understood in the eye of the beholder.

The Habitus and Directionality

In his Outline of a Theory of Practice Pierre Bourdieu approaches questions of objectivity, acculturation, and societal reproduction in a different way than the past authors and philosophers we have studied. Though Bourdieu rejects the primacy of agency of the individual, referring to single humans more as organisms, he does not fully embrace the structuralist and deterministic ideal. From the beginning Bourdieu accepts and expounds upon man's inability to achieve an objective point of view and also identifies some of the inherent limitations in reaching for Objectivism. One such objection to this practices which Bourdieu offers is the potentially huge gap in understanding and meaning between native participants and trained secondary speakers of a language. Bourdieu also identifies the propensity of observers to naturally and unknowingly project their own socially constructing meanings and assessments of behaviors onto the observed. Conversely, though, Bourdieu asserts that individual humans both acculturate to and through language contain limitless potential to rationalize their own behavior and personal understanding. In this way Bourdieu recognizes the weaknesses of applying subjectivity and objectivity to the overarching recreation and perpetuation of human society.

Rather than seeking to wholly prove or disprove either side of the historical dialectic regarding individual agency and structuralism, Bourdieu uses the concept of habitus. Habitus, for Bourdieu, is a range of "systems of durable, transposable dispositions"(72). Or, in reference to the remaking of social reality, habitus is the adaptations to goals based on objective circumstance without the prior skills to obtain those goals and without the totalizing control of a third party or structure (72). Unlike objectivist in the past, Bourdieu argues that though there are objective forces acting upon and acculturating individual humans, the habitus is a historically specific with changing features due to constant chronological reconstruction and rebirth. In this machination, humans are acculturated mostly through imitation and literal experience in the habitus which they were born or socialized. By shirking the emphasis on overarching and deterministic structures, the habitus provides a more full and organic view of societal perpetuation. Bourdieu only refers to habitus in reference to non-totalitarian systems because of the dual importance of habitus in recreating society from the bottom up as well as the top down. I found Bourdieu's comparison of habitus to organizations and societies like the military, which emphasis deconstructive de-culturation combined with teaching and re-culturation, to be especially striking. Most interestingly, these organizations imitate some of the outward influential capacities of the habitus in the "most insignificant details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners" (94). Bourdieu impresses upon the reader the importance of the arbitrary nature and irrational enforcement of these facets of appearance in mimicking the rationale enforcement of the habitus.

Overall, I found Bourdieu's assertions regarding objectivity and subjectivity to be very convincing. Though he leans towards some to the tenets of objectivity in his pronouncements, the author does not follow them to an undue length and hit the same obstructions as other philosophers. Rather, Bourdieu is able to show how individual agency is a factor in the change of culture by demonstrating the ceaseless chronological reformulation of culture and society which is constantly occurring. Objective forces may act upon and influence individuals but the perpetual reassessment of those forces by individuals in the habitus provides a directionality and a means of sociocultural change.

Discipline, Power, and Their Manifestations

Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison present a novel and overarching view of the exercise of coercive disciplinary power and its effect on individuals and manifestations within societies. In my opinion, especially interesting within this reading is Foucault's argument concerning individuals' souls. Foucault identifies the non-corporal effects of power on human beings as a "soul" and a socially malleable human feature. Individuals being punished as well as those who are presided over by disciplinary and order imposing power structures are "unlike Christian theology..not...born in sin and subject to punishment but...born out of methods of punishment, supervision, and restraint" (29). Foucault recognizes and argues that the ramifications of power and the exercise of disciplinary coercion upon human populaces become manifest in those individuals. In reading this characterization of power, I am reminded of our discussion in last week's readings on the historio-anthropological value of seemingly fantastic stories and beliefs. Through colonial power and discipline structures foreign racial values both infiltrated and were reacted against within the superstitions and beliefs of the larger society. This resulted in the construction of a belief which valued human body parts, especially those of certain racial attributes, for luck. In turn a reactionary belief and understanding of monkeys as the servants of malevolent forces seeking to steal body parts resulted in a single, seemingly fantastic event of the killing of a monkey for carrying a plastic bag. Foucault's characterization of the relationship between individuals and the overarching power and coercion schemes invites us to be able to research and understand the source of such social practices and behaviors. By identifying the many dimensions that power interacts on humans down to the individual level, Foucault shows us another point of view for understand human behavior. Also, reading Foucault's conception of the social power practices which affect human behavior is reminiscent of Max Weber's characterization of the Protestant Ethic. I do not think that Foucault represents a fundamental disagreement with Weber's assessment of the rise of capitalism. Although Foucault identifies disciplinarian practices such as time and space regimentation which could have directly informed the rise of capitalistic production, his argument about the abstract effects of power still ring true. Weber's assessment of a Protestant ethic could arguably be a representation of a religious power structure rather than strictly a faithful belief. I do not see a direct conflict between then two points of view but I welcome any comments.

Historical Anthropology

The readings this week, in my opinion, made a good case for the pursuance of historical anthropology. It is clear to most historians that contingency and historical “what ifs” can illuminate and accentuate historical plausibility but require adequate detail in research and focus. Anthropology, as characterized here, seems to have been formed studying overarching influences and themes in order to accurately gauge the reason for and result of cultural change. In my opinion, anthropology must take into account individual aegis in the formation and change of cultures. John and Jean Comaroff write “without human agents, without specified locations and moments and actions, realities are not realized, objects are not objectified, nothing “takes places,” the social is not socialized, and the present has no presence.” In one way this quote indicates that individuals literally create meaning and add meaning to actions, realities, objects, and social relations. However, this quote also impresses the importance of perceiving individual meaning and action in understanding how cultural forms are destroyed or shifted. The perception of History and Anthropology as two conceptual frameworks by which past events, peoples, may be interpreted divides pertinent relationships and comparisons. Historical Anthropology may afford the application of Geertz’s “thick description” and a better and fuller understanding of past events and people. By allowing a closer and more complete description of both the literal events and their causes along with the overarching cultural context, Historical Anthropology can inform us about the how and why of change. These two fields, though analyzing at different levels, are especially related in today’s social histories. As variable and different as insights from each field can give, both History and Anthropology struggle with the fact human culture consists both of individuals as well as characterizing individuals.

Archaeology and Questions of Synchrony and Diachrony

From the readings this week I was most impressed by the seeming incongruities between social anthropology and history. These excerpts of works by Geertz, Levi-Strauss, and Sewell demonstrated the disagreements about both the origins and functionality of human culture. Also, these works presented an overview of the division of understanding between diachronically oriented anthropologists and the mostly synchronically concerned historians. I think that within archaeology both Geertz's synchrony and Levi-Strauss's diachrony have been incorporated by necessity.

This week's readings raised many questions, in my mind, as to the proper temporal focus for historians to adequately grasp the meanings and effects of the people and events in historical studies. I minored in archaeology as an undergrad and as a result was exposed to emphasis on diachronic and cultural structural change in human prehistory. Studying human prehistory forces a broader perspective and acceptance of viable sources of information for understanding past human events and behavior. As a result, archaeologists are often forced to make the most out of any remaining evidence. Archaeology functions on two different levels; one which is concerned with preserving and accurately understanding the literal context (both small scale and large) of evidence, and another focusing on the structural organization of social interaction in prehistory. The first level can be seen in the regimentation of artifact and evidence collection along with contextual preservation at archaeological digs. The second level is played out in the reconstruction (spatially and socially) of past populations and attempts to understand how those humans were socially structured and what brought that society to change or disappear.

In my opinion, these two levels present in the study of Archaeology seem similar to the concepts of, respectively, synchrony and diachrony. In material terms Archaeologist follow a synchronic path in creating Geertz's "thick description." Archaeologist aim to understand local social behavior and culture by seeking to preserve as much understanding of the literal context of material evidence as possible. Alternatively, using that material evidence on larger scales, Archaeologist seek to characterize past social structures in the analysis of trade routes, water manipulation, city organization etc. More specifically though, on the larger scale Archaeologists are diachronically motivated in hopes to uncover the social sources of material evidence to understand changes of cultural relationships and structures in bygone societies.

Objectivity and Access to the Past

I am inclined to agree with Mark Bevir's critique of the limits of a relativistic view of history and the question of access to the past. It seems that if historians accept the unreachable nature of a purely objective accounts of history on which to base induction and arguments, a method such as Bevir's is appropriate. Access to the past and comparison with that past is the most apparent method of historical discourse but if we can not comprehend the historicity of that past, other methods must be developed. Bevir argues that access, or not, to the past does not necessarily mean historical objectivity is an impossibility. Instead, Bevir endeavors to use present conditions and understanding, along with comparison to elucidate historical subjects and judge the merit of arguments. Furthermore, I agree with Bevir that to create a truly objective understanding of history one can not rely on empiricist refutation or affirmation of an argument. This comparative way of viewing history is some ways similar to the idea of the "ideal observer" standing outside the influences of temporally bound observers and able to make qualified and objective statements. Bevir's method of attempting historical objectivity does not require super-human abilities of perception, though. By admitting that we can only "accept things as correct on the basis of rationally justified criteria" Bevir allows historical objectivity to flow from comparison rather than an abstract value of unqualified historical truth.

Weber and the "Spirit"

Max Weber formulates a compelling concept in his description and characterization of the "spirit" of capitalism and its religious roots. The structure of his written work is very effective in flushing out the idea of Protestant asceticism and its role in inspiring the areligious "spirit" of capitalism. Within the first few pages of the work, Weber displays a list financial maxims of Benjamin Franklin in order to establish a cursory meaning and understanding of the "spirit." This description is very successful in capturing the general sentiments that Weber recognizes as socially inherent to capitalistic systems. Though Franklin's excerpts are helpful in comprehending Weber's intentions, the argument of the existence of a "spirit" of capitalism is itself subject to criticism. As noted earlier, the structural organization of The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism serves in great part to further the strength of Weber's argument. By exhibiting the sentiments Franklin very early within the work Weber imbues the idea of a "spirit" with life and a semi-concrete definition from a well known public figure. However, after reading further into this work the very conceptual existence of a "spirit" of capitalism becomes a forgone conclusion within Weber's account of the social and religious histories of Protestantism. Rather than utilizing more space for evidencing in multiple social and religious settings the existence of a widely held "spirit" of capitalism, this work quickly moves into how that "spirit" was formed and disseminated. This gives Weber's work a sense of inevitability as the reader nears the end of his exposition. In the last few pages of the chapter on asceticism, conclusions are formed in nicely wrapped direct social correlations between religious philosophical beliefs and the secular formation of the "spirit" of capitalism. All of this is very effective in convincing the reader of Weber's assertions about the origins and nature of the "spirit", however, a closer look is needed to establish whether there is requisite evidence for this characterization of the social and religious causes of capitalism. Although Weber recognizes and argues that he is merely presenting a partial motivational force for the rise of capitalism, the establishment of a "spirit" requires more analysis of social and material expression of rising capitalist populations.

Week 4: State Capitalism and its Intermediaries

Moishe Postone’s critical reexamination of Marxist philosophy identifies production as the preeminent force which affects economic, political, and in a way, historical realities. In his critique of Friederich Pollock’s writings concerning Post-Liberal Capitalism and State Capitalism Postone asserts that economic organization “is simply a function of the mode and goal of its administration” (100). I agree with Postone’s view of the argument especially in Pollock’s claim that the State Capitalism which formed during the 20th century as analogous with Socialism, in respects to labor and distribution. Pollock’s argument in this case appears, to me, monolithic and to not account for varying degrees of control as well as sources of control within State Capitalism. Although initially it does appear that Socialism and the State Capitalism of Pollock are essentially identical in respects to labor and distribution, Postone is correct to criticize the lack of focus on the means of production. To me, it is extremely important to recognize the intermediate maneuverings of State Capitalism and not simply as an abstraction to be used comparatively. While it is true that extrapolating the course of State Capitalism leads to many of Pollock’s conclusions, using it comparatively against Socialism obscures the transition from Liberal Capitalism as well as the importance of production. For instance, there is no reason to think that an intermediate formation of State Capitalism would necessarily progress to the complete government control of labor and private property. Also, in relation to labor, it seems to me that state control, emanating as public protective measures, would retain the same veiled appearance as Liberal Capitalism. However, the centralization of economic power in bureaucracy appears in legitimate and welcome circumstances in perceived democratic societies. I do not think that State Capitalism and its more centralized and production oriented equivalent, Fascism, can be glossed over on the way to understanding Materialist philosophy.

Concept of Class and Its Usage

In observing the economic base for and the seeming inevitability of Marx & Engels view of the natural subsidence of capitalism into communism, the divisions of class figure prominently into the debate. The writings of Marx and Engels do not shy from using the concept of class to illustrate and and elaborate Materialist principles. Marx identifies wage-laborers, capitalists, and landowners as the essential classes which formed out of the division of labor and the divorce of capital from labor. Marx's argument depends upon the use of class divisions and the requisite generality with which the actions and ways of life of many individuals are quickly and cleanly characterized. One is led to question these labels, though, as the divisions which are used to forward the Materialist view of human interaction are themselves by-products of Marx's theoretical framework. The concept and division of class is used with such finality in Materialist writings that one must step back and question the exact nature of the term. Considering the movements that Materialism and Marxism have been used to forward in the past, Thompson identifies a very real danger in class-consciousness. The arguments using class which Materialism imparts use clearly defined language about the parts of Industrial society and imparts a sense the members of a class are closely related and cohesive.
I am inclined to agree with Thompson when he asserts that the divisions of class have a sense of being and existence owing to their own creation and use. For this reason it is important to impress the use of class as a defining as well as dividing tool. This is to say that using class as a division tool can serve to enforce vagaries about whole groups of people while at the same time imparting characteristics and meanings on those groups. In actuality, those concepts about class can go a long way in the creation and division of groups themselves. I think Marx's arguments would be more easily understood if the interactions of classes were described as individuals relative to one another, rather than groups of interests jockeying for primacy.

Universal History and an Hint of Inevitability

Kant's view of Universal History is founded upon Enlightenment ideals and a rationalization of the seeming chaos found all around us in the literal world. By attributing to Nature all of the forces which motivate and move mankind to further exploits and growth, Kant gives an sense of inevitability to the function of History. More simply put, the theses of Kant recognize a goal (or perhaps THE goal) of history to establish a civil society in which all individuals are free enough to reach their potential. To me this gives a finality to the study of history and maintains that at some point the efforts of historians will aid in the creation of the civil society which Nature, or Reason, intends for humanity. I am inclined to agree more with Hegel's criticism of the lofty Natural Law based argument of Kant. Kant seems to maintain that with a liberal enough view of history and a "true" understanding of the function of History mankind will eventually learn enough to result in a highly effective and free civil society. I do not think it is realistic to assume that studying many different actions and contexts will undoubtedly lead to the recognition of universal and natural laws and principles. Hegel is not so optimistic about what can be gleaned from historical record and places more emphasis on Philosophical History as a means of education and improvement. I agree with Hegel because in a metaphysical sense what is "learned" from historical record and study is actually the execution of reason on the part of the historian. This reading leaves me pondering the role of reason as an inherently individualistic act in relation to the creation of broader societal histories referred to by Hegel, Kant, and Renke.