Objectivity and Access to the Past

I am inclined to agree with Mark Bevir's critique of the limits of a relativistic view of history and the question of access to the past. It seems that if historians accept the unreachable nature of a purely objective accounts of history on which to base induction and arguments, a method such as Bevir's is appropriate. Access to the past and comparison with that past is the most apparent method of historical discourse but if we can not comprehend the historicity of that past, other methods must be developed. Bevir argues that access, or not, to the past does not necessarily mean historical objectivity is an impossibility. Instead, Bevir endeavors to use present conditions and understanding, along with comparison to elucidate historical subjects and judge the merit of arguments. Furthermore, I agree with Bevir that to create a truly objective understanding of history one can not rely on empiricist refutation or affirmation of an argument. This comparative way of viewing history is some ways similar to the idea of the "ideal observer" standing outside the influences of temporally bound observers and able to make qualified and objective statements. Bevir's method of attempting historical objectivity does not require super-human abilities of perception, though. By admitting that we can only "accept things as correct on the basis of rationally justified criteria" Bevir allows historical objectivity to flow from comparison rather than an abstract value of unqualified historical truth.

Weber and the "Spirit"

Max Weber formulates a compelling concept in his description and characterization of the "spirit" of capitalism and its religious roots. The structure of his written work is very effective in flushing out the idea of Protestant asceticism and its role in inspiring the areligious "spirit" of capitalism. Within the first few pages of the work, Weber displays a list financial maxims of Benjamin Franklin in order to establish a cursory meaning and understanding of the "spirit." This description is very successful in capturing the general sentiments that Weber recognizes as socially inherent to capitalistic systems. Though Franklin's excerpts are helpful in comprehending Weber's intentions, the argument of the existence of a "spirit" of capitalism is itself subject to criticism. As noted earlier, the structural organization of The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism serves in great part to further the strength of Weber's argument. By exhibiting the sentiments Franklin very early within the work Weber imbues the idea of a "spirit" with life and a semi-concrete definition from a well known public figure. However, after reading further into this work the very conceptual existence of a "spirit" of capitalism becomes a forgone conclusion within Weber's account of the social and religious histories of Protestantism. Rather than utilizing more space for evidencing in multiple social and religious settings the existence of a widely held "spirit" of capitalism, this work quickly moves into how that "spirit" was formed and disseminated. This gives Weber's work a sense of inevitability as the reader nears the end of his exposition. In the last few pages of the chapter on asceticism, conclusions are formed in nicely wrapped direct social correlations between religious philosophical beliefs and the secular formation of the "spirit" of capitalism. All of this is very effective in convincing the reader of Weber's assertions about the origins and nature of the "spirit", however, a closer look is needed to establish whether there is requisite evidence for this characterization of the social and religious causes of capitalism. Although Weber recognizes and argues that he is merely presenting a partial motivational force for the rise of capitalism, the establishment of a "spirit" requires more analysis of social and material expression of rising capitalist populations.

Week 4: State Capitalism and its Intermediaries

Moishe Postone’s critical reexamination of Marxist philosophy identifies production as the preeminent force which affects economic, political, and in a way, historical realities. In his critique of Friederich Pollock’s writings concerning Post-Liberal Capitalism and State Capitalism Postone asserts that economic organization “is simply a function of the mode and goal of its administration” (100). I agree with Postone’s view of the argument especially in Pollock’s claim that the State Capitalism which formed during the 20th century as analogous with Socialism, in respects to labor and distribution. Pollock’s argument in this case appears, to me, monolithic and to not account for varying degrees of control as well as sources of control within State Capitalism. Although initially it does appear that Socialism and the State Capitalism of Pollock are essentially identical in respects to labor and distribution, Postone is correct to criticize the lack of focus on the means of production. To me, it is extremely important to recognize the intermediate maneuverings of State Capitalism and not simply as an abstraction to be used comparatively. While it is true that extrapolating the course of State Capitalism leads to many of Pollock’s conclusions, using it comparatively against Socialism obscures the transition from Liberal Capitalism as well as the importance of production. For instance, there is no reason to think that an intermediate formation of State Capitalism would necessarily progress to the complete government control of labor and private property. Also, in relation to labor, it seems to me that state control, emanating as public protective measures, would retain the same veiled appearance as Liberal Capitalism. However, the centralization of economic power in bureaucracy appears in legitimate and welcome circumstances in perceived democratic societies. I do not think that State Capitalism and its more centralized and production oriented equivalent, Fascism, can be glossed over on the way to understanding Materialist philosophy.

Concept of Class and Its Usage

In observing the economic base for and the seeming inevitability of Marx & Engels view of the natural subsidence of capitalism into communism, the divisions of class figure prominently into the debate. The writings of Marx and Engels do not shy from using the concept of class to illustrate and and elaborate Materialist principles. Marx identifies wage-laborers, capitalists, and landowners as the essential classes which formed out of the division of labor and the divorce of capital from labor. Marx's argument depends upon the use of class divisions and the requisite generality with which the actions and ways of life of many individuals are quickly and cleanly characterized. One is led to question these labels, though, as the divisions which are used to forward the Materialist view of human interaction are themselves by-products of Marx's theoretical framework. The concept and division of class is used with such finality in Materialist writings that one must step back and question the exact nature of the term. Considering the movements that Materialism and Marxism have been used to forward in the past, Thompson identifies a very real danger in class-consciousness. The arguments using class which Materialism imparts use clearly defined language about the parts of Industrial society and imparts a sense the members of a class are closely related and cohesive.
I am inclined to agree with Thompson when he asserts that the divisions of class have a sense of being and existence owing to their own creation and use. For this reason it is important to impress the use of class as a defining as well as dividing tool. This is to say that using class as a division tool can serve to enforce vagaries about whole groups of people while at the same time imparting characteristics and meanings on those groups. In actuality, those concepts about class can go a long way in the creation and division of groups themselves. I think Marx's arguments would be more easily understood if the interactions of classes were described as individuals relative to one another, rather than groups of interests jockeying for primacy.

Universal History and an Hint of Inevitability

Kant's view of Universal History is founded upon Enlightenment ideals and a rationalization of the seeming chaos found all around us in the literal world. By attributing to Nature all of the forces which motivate and move mankind to further exploits and growth, Kant gives an sense of inevitability to the function of History. More simply put, the theses of Kant recognize a goal (or perhaps THE goal) of history to establish a civil society in which all individuals are free enough to reach their potential. To me this gives a finality to the study of history and maintains that at some point the efforts of historians will aid in the creation of the civil society which Nature, or Reason, intends for humanity. I am inclined to agree more with Hegel's criticism of the lofty Natural Law based argument of Kant. Kant seems to maintain that with a liberal enough view of history and a "true" understanding of the function of History mankind will eventually learn enough to result in a highly effective and free civil society. I do not think it is realistic to assume that studying many different actions and contexts will undoubtedly lead to the recognition of universal and natural laws and principles. Hegel is not so optimistic about what can be gleaned from historical record and places more emphasis on Philosophical History as a means of education and improvement. I agree with Hegel because in a metaphysical sense what is "learned" from historical record and study is actually the execution of reason on the part of the historian. This reading leaves me pondering the role of reason as an inherently individualistic act in relation to the creation of broader societal histories referred to by Hegel, Kant, and Renke.