Monday, October 26, 2009

The Habitus and Directionality

In his Outline of a Theory of Practice Pierre Bourdieu approaches questions of objectivity, acculturation, and societal reproduction in a different way than the past authors and philosophers we have studied. Though Bourdieu rejects the primacy of agency of the individual, referring to single humans more as organisms, he does not fully embrace the structuralist and deterministic ideal. From the beginning Bourdieu accepts and expounds upon man's inability to achieve an objective point of view and also identifies some of the inherent limitations in reaching for Objectivism. One such objection to this practices which Bourdieu offers is the potentially huge gap in understanding and meaning between native participants and trained secondary speakers of a language. Bourdieu also identifies the propensity of observers to naturally and unknowingly project their own socially constructing meanings and assessments of behaviors onto the observed. Conversely, though, Bourdieu asserts that individual humans both acculturate to and through language contain limitless potential to rationalize their own behavior and personal understanding. In this way Bourdieu recognizes the weaknesses of applying subjectivity and objectivity to the overarching recreation and perpetuation of human society.

Rather than seeking to wholly prove or disprove either side of the historical dialectic regarding individual agency and structuralism, Bourdieu uses the concept of habitus. Habitus, for Bourdieu, is a range of "systems of durable, transposable dispositions"(72). Or, in reference to the remaking of social reality, habitus is the adaptations to goals based on objective circumstance without the prior skills to obtain those goals and without the totalizing control of a third party or structure (72). Unlike objectivist in the past, Bourdieu argues that though there are objective forces acting upon and acculturating individual humans, the habitus is a historically specific with changing features due to constant chronological reconstruction and rebirth. In this machination, humans are acculturated mostly through imitation and literal experience in the habitus which they were born or socialized. By shirking the emphasis on overarching and deterministic structures, the habitus provides a more full and organic view of societal perpetuation. Bourdieu only refers to habitus in reference to non-totalitarian systems because of the dual importance of habitus in recreating society from the bottom up as well as the top down. I found Bourdieu's comparison of habitus to organizations and societies like the military, which emphasis deconstructive de-culturation combined with teaching and re-culturation, to be especially striking. Most interestingly, these organizations imitate some of the outward influential capacities of the habitus in the "most insignificant details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners" (94). Bourdieu impresses upon the reader the importance of the arbitrary nature and irrational enforcement of these facets of appearance in mimicking the rationale enforcement of the habitus.

Overall, I found Bourdieu's assertions regarding objectivity and subjectivity to be very convincing. Though he leans towards some to the tenets of objectivity in his pronouncements, the author does not follow them to an undue length and hit the same obstructions as other philosophers. Rather, Bourdieu is able to show how individual agency is a factor in the change of culture by demonstrating the ceaseless chronological reformulation of culture and society which is constantly occurring. Objective forces may act upon and influence individuals but the perpetual reassessment of those forces by individuals in the habitus provides a directionality and a means of sociocultural change.

Monday, October 19, 2009

Discipline, Power, and Their Manifestations

Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison present a novel and overarching view of the exercise of coercive disciplinary power and its effect on individuals and manifestations within societies. In my opinion, especially interesting within this reading is Foucault's argument concerning individuals' souls. Foucault identifies the non-corporal effects of power on human beings as a "soul" and a socially malleable human feature. Individuals being punished as well as those who are presided over by disciplinary and order imposing power structures are "unlike Christian theology..not...born in sin and subject to punishment but...born out of methods of punishment, supervision, and restraint" (29). Foucault recognizes and argues that the ramifications of power and the exercise of disciplinary coercion upon human populaces become manifest in those individuals. In reading this characterization of power, I am reminded of our discussion in last week's readings on the historio-anthropological value of seemingly fantastic stories and beliefs. Through colonial power and discipline structures foreign racial values both infiltrated and were reacted against within the superstitions and beliefs of the larger society. This resulted in the construction of a belief which valued human body parts, especially those of certain racial attributes, for luck. In turn a reactionary belief and understanding of monkeys as the servants of malevolent forces seeking to steal body parts resulted in a single, seemingly fantastic event of the killing of a monkey for carrying a plastic bag. Foucault's characterization of the relationship between individuals and the overarching power and coercion schemes invites us to be able to research and understand the source of such social practices and behaviors. By identifying the many dimensions that power interacts on humans down to the individual level, Foucault shows us another point of view for understand human behavior. Also, reading Foucault's conception of the social power practices which affect human behavior is reminiscent of Max Weber's characterization of the Protestant Ethic. I do not think that Foucault represents a fundamental disagreement with Weber's assessment of the rise of capitalism. Although Foucault identifies disciplinarian practices such as time and space regimentation which could have directly informed the rise of capitalistic production, his argument about the abstract effects of power still ring true. Weber's assessment of a Protestant ethic could arguably be a representation of a religious power structure rather than strictly a faithful belief. I do not see a direct conflict between then two points of view but I welcome any comments.

Monday, October 12, 2009

Historical Anthropology

The readings this week, in my opinion, made a good case for the pursuance of historical anthropology. It is clear to most historians that contingency and historical “what ifs” can illuminate and accentuate historical plausibility but require adequate detail in research and focus. Anthropology, as characterized here, seems to have been formed studying overarching influences and themes in order to accurately gauge the reason for and result of cultural change. In my opinion, anthropology must take into account individual aegis in the formation and change of cultures. John and Jean Comaroff write “without human agents, without specified locations and moments and actions, realities are not realized, objects are not objectified, nothing “takes places,” the social is not socialized, and the present has no presence.” In one way this quote indicates that individuals literally create meaning and add meaning to actions, realities, objects, and social relations. However, this quote also impresses the importance of perceiving individual meaning and action in understanding how cultural forms are destroyed or shifted. The perception of History and Anthropology as two conceptual frameworks by which past events, peoples, may be interpreted divides pertinent relationships and comparisons. Historical Anthropology may afford the application of Geertz’s “thick description” and a better and fuller understanding of past events and people. By allowing a closer and more complete description of both the literal events and their causes along with the overarching cultural context, Historical Anthropology can inform us about the how and why of change. These two fields, though analyzing at different levels, are especially related in today’s social histories. As variable and different as insights from each field can give, both History and Anthropology struggle with the fact human culture consists both of individuals as well as characterizing individuals.

Monday, October 5, 2009

Archaeology and Questions of Synchrony and Diachrony

From the readings this week I was most impressed by the seeming incongruities between social anthropology and history. These excerpts of works by Geertz, Levi-Strauss, and Sewell demonstrated the disagreements about both the origins and functionality of human culture. Also, these works presented an overview of the division of understanding between diachronically oriented anthropologists and the mostly synchronically concerned historians. I think that within archaeology both Geertz's synchrony and Levi-Strauss's diachrony have been incorporated by necessity.

This week's readings raised many questions, in my mind, as to the proper temporal focus for historians to adequately grasp the meanings and effects of the people and events in historical studies. I minored in archaeology as an undergrad and as a result was exposed to emphasis on diachronic and cultural structural change in human prehistory. Studying human prehistory forces a broader perspective and acceptance of viable sources of information for understanding past human events and behavior. As a result, archaeologists are often forced to make the most out of any remaining evidence. Archaeology functions on two different levels; one which is concerned with preserving and accurately understanding the literal context (both small scale and large) of evidence, and another focusing on the structural organization of social interaction in prehistory. The first level can be seen in the regimentation of artifact and evidence collection along with contextual preservation at archaeological digs. The second level is played out in the reconstruction (spatially and socially) of past populations and attempts to understand how those humans were socially structured and what brought that society to change or disappear.

In my opinion, these two levels present in the study of Archaeology seem similar to the concepts of, respectively, synchrony and diachrony. In material terms Archaeologist follow a synchronic path in creating Geertz's "thick description." Archaeologist aim to understand local social behavior and culture by seeking to preserve as much understanding of the literal context of material evidence as possible. Alternatively, using that material evidence on larger scales, Archaeologist seek to characterize past social structures in the analysis of trade routes, water manipulation, city organization etc. More specifically though, on the larger scale Archaeologists are diachronically motivated in hopes to uncover the social sources of material evidence to understand changes of cultural relationships and structures in bygone societies.